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Investment, industrial strategy and corporate 
governance 
 
Ciaran Driver 
 
 
The supply and coordination of investment in physical capital, organisation, infrastructure, 
skills, and innovation is part of industrial strategy. For convenience I will call all these activities 
‘investment’ as they tend to be conceptually similar, and are often related at the 
macroeconomic level if only because a deficiency in one (such as skills) may impact on 
another. There is no exact consensus on how these decisions should be taken in a mixed 
economy. The relative advantage of market and planning will depend of the conditions of the 
time. For example, when there is a great deal of technological or demand uncertainty, or where 
public interest is involved, greater weight may be put on pooling information and coordinating 
individual investment decisions. 
 
The potential blunders that our governments make have to be balanced against the narrow 
vision of the market, which is better at reacting to existing demand than imagining new needs. 
This is why major innovations such as the internet, transport, electronics and novel 
pharmaceutical advances have often benefited at the outset from major programmes of public 
research and standard setting. In today’s world, innovations produced by the major 
corporations are increasingly incremental, even where advanced original science is employed. 
Adaptation to new opportunities by private corporations are insufficiently incentivised because, 
for transformative systems, many of the costs and benefits of innovation accrue to other 
parties as spillovers (externalities). This chapter explores this issue, and considers how UK 
industrial strategy can induce an investment-led economic model through corporate 
governance reform. 
 
Coordinating investment 
 
A recent All-Party Parliamentary Group report concluded that ‘the UK currently lacks a 
coordinated and coherent approach to identifying its potential vulnerabilities, and developing 
long-term strategies to mitigate them’ (Manufacturing Commission, 2015: 10). This is not 
surprising – economies that are primarily market-oriented often lack the political will to 
consider alternatives. Criticising this, Richard Nelson of Columbia University argued for a 
loosening of the boundaries between public and private. In his view, ‘a wide range of human 
activities that employ a large share of the economy’s resources diverge from what is 
considered standard economic activity’ (Nelson 2002: 242) and that the role of non-market 
governance structures has been ‘repressed in much of the current discussion of economic 
organization (2002: 212). This suggests a dilemma at the heart of economic development of 
advanced nations where the market form is ill-adapted to solving some problems and, due to 
insufficient belief in public provision, these concerns become orphaned. The result is that value 
lies unlocked not just for these activities themselves but for market activities that might feed 
into them. 
 
In the terminology of business strategy, there is scope for a ‘shaping’ approach, in which 
industrial planning is more pro-active than re-active. Well-positioned firms occasionally get the 
 chance, under fluid technology and demand, to reorganise a whole industry on proactive lines, 
as HP did with printing, or Fedex with delivery, or the modern network firms with search, 
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transport and accommodation. But sometimes change takes place over such a long time and 
large scale that it cannot be easily pioneered by even the largest firm – and sometimes it could 
be undesirable and undemocratic for that to occur. In these circumstances, public or private- 
public partnerships may be useful, and the opportunities stemming from such undertakings 
can then stretch back over a long supply chain through services, products, capital goods, 
design and R&D. Coordination and planning of investment has already occurred in the case 
of renewable energy, but could usefully be employed in helping the emergence of new 
industries and innovative solutions that will feed into supply chains for social needs such as 
housing, care and health and education.1 
 
Under-investment in the UK 
 
Weak market signals can delay the adaptation of the industrial structure, but there are also 
other forces constraining private firms. Low investment has been a perennial issue for the UK, 
which invests less than comparator countries. This has often been discussed as if it were a 
temporary problem. The idea that corporations consistently under-invest because of some 
systematic failure of policy or governance disappeared with the rise of liberal market views 
many decades ago. A former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England remarked towards the 
end of the Thatcher administration that any required resurgence in investment would arise 
automatically since there was no obvious market failure involved (see Driver and Temple, 
2014: 50). Of course, this did not happen then, and we are still waiting for such a resurgence. 
 
Even modern-day Keynesians have tended to see no long-run problem with the market level 
of investment (no supply constraint), focusing instead on a possible demand deficiency. There 
may be an occasional worry about the adequacy of finance for investment particularly for small 
and new firms but this is a footnote pointing to an anomaly rather than a systematic failure. 
Such insouciance is at one level surprising. The record of investment in the UK has been 
consistently poor both absolutely and in relation to comparative economies, and especially so 
in the current context. Five years after the onset of the financial crisis, the Bank estimated that 
each employee was operating with five percent less capital than would have been the case 
had the economy been on its pre-crisis path (see Driver and Temple, 2013). The second five 
years since the crisis has been even worse for investment; recent survey evidence from the 
Bank shows one third of firms saying that they invest less than appropriate, compared with 
only 2 per cent that were overinvesting (Salaheen et al., 2017). 
 
Of course, the UK economy has suffered exceptional difficulties in the last decade due to the 
exposed position of its international banks and the self-imposed burden of uncertainty induced 
by Brexit. But it would be wrong to think of the pattern of low investment as something that 
only began with the financial crisis. Low investment both relative and absolute has 
characterised the UK economy for half a century, to the extent that is has come to be accepted 
as a national norm. Nor is under-investment confined to fixed capital: OECD data show that 
business financed R&D as a percentage of GDP has been much lower in the last two decades 
than before then. 
 
Despite the flinty disregard of some economists and policy-makers for this reluctance to invest, 
there have been periodic outbreaks of doubt and unease. Reviewing trends in the UK 
economy, a different Deputy Governor of the Bank asked publicly about the ‘puzzle’ of low 
investment (Gieve, 2006). How was it possible for the UK to have the lowest whole-economy 
investment spend since the 1960s, given the historically high ratio of financial surplus to GDP 
and unprecedented low borrowing costs? Such expressions of concern have multiplied in 
recent years, but if opinion is changing it is only because chickens have truly come home to 
roost. Near-zero productivity growth for a decade has so alarmed policy circles that even 
orthodox commentators have ended up calling for more investment, even if there is little idea 
of how to bring this about or why the problem has occurred. 
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Corporate culture, corporate governance, and investment 
 
The proclivity of corporations to invest capital depends on the corporate culture that it adopts. 
This varies across firms but is influenced by institutional features – regulation, takeover codes, 
company law and codes of conduct that concern the duty of directors and the rights of different 
types of investor. This complex of institutions is known collectively as ‘corporate governance’, 
and it affects the balance of power between the various parties or ‘stakeholders’ involved with 
a company’s activities such as investors, managers and workers. When a firm’s corporate 
governance is attuned mainly to the interests of investors it tends to invest less capital (Bauer 
et al., 2008). Some interpret this as a reason for celebrating a form of governance that gives 
priority to investors as it amounts to a strict monitoring of the investment spend. But of course 
this argument only works if investors are seen as reliable, far-sighted and neutral judges of 
collective economic opportunities. This is the position of the influential economist and 
commentator Lawrence Summers, typified by his defence of current arrangements for 
corporate governance in companies like Amazon which, according to Summers (2018), trade 
at huge multiples to current profits because of credible long-term plans. But this argument is 
weak. Technology companies are trading on the basis of their monopoly power, which allows 
them to plan ahead. 
 
While the economics profession by and large denied any supply side problem of investment – 
and ignored adverse effects stemming from corporate governance – other business-oriented 
commentators were more prescient. Pioneering voices such as Will Hutton (1996) in the UK, 
Margaret Blair (1995) and William Lazonick (2018) in the United States focused their attention 
on the institutions that initiate and authorise investment decisions in the modern economy. 
They argued that the system of stock market capitalism had changed in the last decades of 
the twentieth century. Before that, shareholder power was diffuse and rarely seen as a 
constraint on managers’ plans for investment and innovation. From around the 1980s 
onwards, under pressure from globalisation and footloose finance, managers came to accept 
that they needed to be responsive to shareholder concerns. Under a new framework of 
‘shareholder primacy’, serious power was gradually transferred into hands of shareholder 
representatives and shareholder primacy became a distinct mode of governance. 
 
The new system was trumpeted as one that could direct the allocation of capital to where it 
was most needed – taking it from firms with excess cash and investing it in new enterprise. In 
the heady years of globalisation it was even argued that country growth rates depended on 
how developed their financial systems were, especially stock markets. Such a view has been 
knocked sideways, by crises of speculation in emerging markets, by the dot.com crash at the 
beginning of the century, and later by the huge mis-allocation of finance that characterised the 
years leading up to the financial crash. Macroeconomists have at last begun to recognise that 
financialisation has costs as well as benefits. Furthermore, serious quantitative work has now 
identified shareholder primacy-based corporate governance as a clear cause of under- 
investment, alongside more traditional ones of lower competition (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 
2017). 
 
Shareholder primacy, investment and stakeholder solutions 
 
The Shareholder Primacy system of corporate governance prevailing in the UK and other 
stock-market oriented economies assumes by default that the interests of shareholders are 
normally coincident with the general good. This system has evolved as a muddled response 
to the problem that company managers may have interests distinct from owners, and may 
engage in self-serving activity. But why should shareholder interests be dominant anyway? 
Elsewhere I have laid out at length the tortuous logic that is supposed to justify this, but here 
I will just say there is no good reason (see Driver and Thompson, 2018). A different system of 
stakeholder capitalism where power is shared with workers and other interested parties works 
perfectly well in some parts of the global economy and there are examples of non-shareholder 
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enterprise in all economies. Shareholder primacy as a governance system is neither rational 
nor reasonable. Shareholders have their own legitimate interests, like all other stakeholders, 
but these should not be equated with the ‘common good’. The system is not reasonable 
because the steps taken to align manager and owner interests are often counterproductive 
with all sorts of unanticipated side effects on the general economy. One example is the system 
of rewarding chief executives with extraordinary incentive pay linked to the current or near- 
term value of the company’s shares. Systematic distrust of such managers, exacerbated by 
the governance system itself, leads shareholders to prefer signals of performance in the form 
of early and constant pay-outs of cash, which simultaneously enrich senior managers but 
make it difficult for firms to invest and grow. 
 
The incentive for managers to under-invest is now one of the most discussed topics in the 
financial press. Not only do many business executives worry about pressure from owners to 
return cash, but leading financial executives castigate their own industry about the same thing. 
At the same time, normally sober academics, central bankers, consultancy companies and 
politicians have been convinced of the message. The City firm Ernst and Young says that 
investors prefer ‘cash cows to capex’ (see Atkins, 2015) while Credit Suisse (2015) has 
identified ‘a noisy campaign by activist investors’ for a shift in capital allocation away from 
investment and towards buybacks and dividends. 
 
What is it exactly these critics think is the nub of the problem, and how do they propose 
resolving it? These are important questions because, while it is sometimes good to be at least 
half-right, the cure can often be as bad as the disease. The orthodox critique is that 
shareholder capitalism’s shortcomings stem from poorly-designed incentives that allow 
managers to undermine a well-functioning system of shareholder primacy. At least the first 
half is correct. Managerial pay is out of control. And we have to respect the informed view of 
direct participants in the financial markets, such as Andrew Smithers (2013), who argues that 
current incentives encourage managers to pull money out of productive uses to engage in 
financial games. It is worth asking, however, whether there is any system of high-powered 
financial incentives that could not be gamed in some way by informed executives. Again, there 
are some orthodox commentators who agree with this, and seek other solutions to counter the 
pressure for low investment. Some argue that shareholder power would become functional if 
it were more concentrated; others that shareholders themselves are long-termist, but are let 
down by the layers of complex and costly intermediates between them and firms; still others 
want to confer more voting power on long-horizon shareholders, to create new classes of 
committed shareholders, or to put conditions on activist manipulation. Each of these positions 
has some merit. But each also seeks to tweak the version of shareholder capitalism that 
emerged forty years ago, rather than renewing it fundamentally. 
 
There is something in modern financialised capitalism that constrains investment to be lower 
than warranted. One route to fundamental reform is to dilute the power of shareholders in 
favour of other stakeholders (see Driver and Thompson, 2018). In the US, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren has introduced a Bill into Congress to enforce a 40 per cent stakeholder representation 
on company boards – something that has been attacked by Harvard Professor Mark Roe 
(2018) as if it were a fatal disease: ‘The Act’s effects are easily predictable: capital would be 
trapped in large companies and mis-invested. Smaller companies would be deprived of funds, 
and wealth would be transferred from public investors to corporate insiders.’ Yet there is no 
consistent body of evidence supporting a negative net outcome for stakeholding governance. 
To the contrary, informed opinion and empirical research in contexts such as Northern Europe 
generally finds that profitability is maintained under such systems while they tend to be less 
unequal and with higher skill levels that the UK model (see Driver and Thompson, 2018). The 
more relevant question concerns how easy it is to incorporate aspects of these systems in an 
historically different context. But some counterweight to shareholder power is now urgently 
required. 
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Conclusion 
 
Investment is an important part of industrial strategy, since markets are less good at 
anticipating need than in responding to existing demand, given the coordination of effort and 
the sharing of costs and benefits that are involved. This feature of markets, which is particularly 
important at time of fundamental technical or organisational change, explains to some extent 
the current low investment rate by private industry. A second powerful influence is the 
prevailing system of corporate governance. Shareholder primacy is inherently biased against 
re-investment, and puts persistent pressure on firms to return cash to investors. It is unlikely 
that this corporate governance effect is remediable except by drastic reform of the balance of 
power within corporations. 
 
 
Notes 
1. The need for addressing links between market and non-market issues is evident in the wish list for 
government action that accompanied the recent submission by the CBI for the 2017 Spring Budget. 
Of the thirteen key recommendations, four concerned education, skills, and employee well-being, with 
a further three concerning inputs from infrastructure, energy and research. But the need for a rethink 
of public-private interaction and boundaries is not commonplace. As noted by the Financial Times 
columnist Martin Wolf (2018), ‘[t]he financial crisis was a devastating failure of the free market that 
followed a period of rising inequality within many countries. Yet, contrary to what happened in the 
1970s, policymakers have barely questioned the relative roles of government and markets’. 
2. See Gieve, 2006. It may be asked whether this paradox is such a puzzle, given the prevailing 
culture of ideas. The macroeconomics that UK students learned from textbooks – and presumably 
that which their professors believed – claimed that low capital investment was irrelevant to the 
country’s problems. Among the reasons given for this was that jobs could not be created by 
investment but only by labour market reform. Indeed some even suggested that investment could be 
positively harmful in that the costly installation of fixed capital guarantees an increase in workers 
bargaining power against the owners who have sunk this capital (see Driver and Temple, 2014, 
especially chapters 2 and 4). Other economists downplayed any investment problem by claiming that 
intangible capital compensated for lower fixed investment. But included in intangibles is rent-seeking, 
advertising and fictitious goodwill that is never depreciated. 
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